Introduction A co-payment fee of EUR10 was introduced in Cyprus, in order to cope with overcrowding of emergency room services. The scope of this paper is the assessment of the short-term impact of this measure. Methods We used an interrupted time-series autoregressive integrated moving average model, and we analyzed official data from Cyprus' largest emergency room facility for three years. Results Co-payment is associated with a 16 % statistically significant reduction of emergency room visits. No impact was observed in categories of teenagers, children, infants, and people over 70 years old. Conclusions Co-payment was proven to be effective in Cyprus' emergency room setting and is expected to lessen congestion in the emergency room. The price insensitivity of people aged over 70 years, teenagers, children and infants, merits additional research for the identification of the underlying reasons.
Introduction
The use of the emergency room (ER) constitutes an area susceptible to exploitation by patients, due to reduced (or nonexistence of) fees, and to the perceived ease of access [1, 2] . In point of fact, several studies demonstrated that a significant percentage of people visiting ERs (up to 57 %) could be classified as non-urgent cases [3] [4] [5] . Previous findings from the USA suggest that patients visit ERs because they magnify the perceived severity of their health conditions [5] . A prevailing perception is that the quality of ER service is superior to that of a physician [6] . Moreover, ER has been established as a one-stop shop venue; patients can have all tests performed in one place, without extra cost or even without any cost at all. ER offers convenient access after-hours, and for people who are not registered with a primary-care physician. Other drivers of ER overuse include lack of access to timely primary-care services and even referral to the ER by primary-care physicians themselves.
Finally, private hospitals in health systems, as in the case of both USA and Cyprus, have a financial incentive to provide ER, since they will be reimbursed accordingly. Even more significantly, hospitals are legally bound to provide ER care to all, including people who cannot enroll to health system services, such as irregular immigrants [6] .
Impact of ER Overuse
ER visits incur significant costs to payers and some authors have estimated that a visit to an ER costs up to four times more compared to an office visit [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . More significantly, ER overcrowding is significantly associated with poor quality of care, as assessed by delay and lack of treatment [12, 13] . In 2007, the New England Healthcare Institute (NEHI) estimated that ER overuse was identified as the fourth largest cause of resource waste, accounting for US$38 billion wasteful spending, that is 30 % of total wasted health-care expenditure [14] .
Approaches to Reduce ER Overuse
A magnitude of health policy reforms has been implemented in order to reduce the unnecessary burden imposed on ERs. The restructuring of primary-care services, aimed at improving access and lessening ER congestion, especially after-hours and on weekends, has been performed by several European countries. Many EU countries availed of this, as attested by a reported 20 % reduction in ER visits [15] [16] [17] . Other strategies include the utilization of alternative approaches for non-urgent primary care, such as nurse practitioners and community nurses. Moreover, referrals of patients to their health-care centers [18] , and the establishment of telephone consultations, have led to a significant reduction of ER visits in the USA [19, 20] .
Incentives and disincentives for visits to ERs have been also implemented. Cost sharing, in the sense of increasing patient's responsibility, has been documented to be a positive approach to reducing unnecessary use of health resources [21, 22] . This battles moral hazard, which is the tendency of people to exploit health services when these are provided without cost [23] . Although it is also used as a financing tool, the optimum use of a co-payment is to tackle the overutilization of health services in the context of inefficient health demand, especially when cost of treatment exceeds the benefits to the patient [24] .Therefore, by capitalizing on this measure, it will presumably increase the cost of social welfare. Co-payment also serves as a tool to channel patients to preferred health-care settings. However, there are some caveats. It should also be taken into account that introduction of co-payment in low amounts, which may serve as a face-saving tactic by the government and is more likely to be accepted by social stakeholders, has a discernible impact on health utilization. On the contrary, high amounts of co-payment can impede the access for patients, especially of cost-sensitive and frequent healthcare users, to the necessary health care [25, 26] . Everything being equal, the latter does not cancel out expenses, but instead, defers them to a later and more costly stage, a phenomenon depicted as ''hidden costs'' [27] . In light of the above, if arbitrary and unjustified amounts of co-payment are imposed, this will unavoidably distort equity, since user charges disproportionally affect people with more health care needs and with fewer financial resources [28, 29] . In this sense, co-payment has an ambiguous and context-sensitive position as a measure to restrain demand-induced overutilization of health care. Therefore, a trade-off between efficiency and equity must be achieved. To this end, discounts, exceptions, and maximum charge ceilings, apply frequently in all co-payment schemes, contingent to ability to pay and overall health condition [30, 31] .
Currently, there are limited data available on health-care utilization in ER and impact of co-payment. Most interestingly, it was proven that in the ER setting, co-payment was promoting self-triage among patients, therefore reducing unnecessary ER visits [2, 32] . Some countries, Italy [33] and the USA [34] have applied co-payment selectively by classifying users into urgent and non-urgent, thus safeguarding equity.
Cyprus
Cyprus is currently experiencing a financial crisis, due to the inordinate exposure of its relatively small economy to the failing Greek economy. In this context, a loan agreement, in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), was signed between Cyprus and a committee consisting of international lenders (European Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank). In the MoU there were several explicit recommendations aiming ''to strengthen the sustainability of the funding structure and the efficiency of public healthcare provision'' [35] .
The current health system provides free public health care to 85 % of the population. Prior to the financial recession, no user-charges were applicable, a rare feature among European countries. This has escalated to explicit manifestation of overutilization of health care, as primarily attested by overuse of ER, polypharmacy, and inappropriate ordering of laboratory examinations [36, 37] . The ER sector has been extensively overused by patients, due to long waiting lists in the primary health-care sector. This was further aggravated by free access, which largely explains why the system was stretched well beyond its capacity. All the aforementioned attributes of the system gradually shifted patients to the use of ER, under the assumption that they would get faster access without paying more. ER departments are completely funded by public funds on a basis of annual fixed budget, which is not related to output. Therefore, supplier-induced demand is ruled out.
In August 2013, the first wave of reforms was enacted, which consisted of cost-sharing measures, such as the introduction of co-payment in pharmaceuticals, laboratory ordering, and ER visits. Co-payment for pharmaceuticals and laboratory examination ordering is applicable only to public health-care sector beneficiaries, while co-payment for ER visits is applicable to all users regardless of beneficiary and residence status. Therefore, we assume that there is little, if any, synergy between these measures. Co-payment in ER comes in the form of a EUR10 fixed fee per visit. In contrast to other countries, this is applicable to all users of ER, without classification into urgent and non-urgent [6, 23] .
The scope of this paper is to identify whether and to what extent cost sharing impacted the use of ER in the Cyprus Health Care sector. For the scope of this study we analyzed data from visits to the ER department of Nicosia General Hospital.
Methods

Data
We used data from Nicosia General Hospital, which is the biggest hospital in Cyprus and a reference center for all medical specialties. It is a public hospital and provides emergency services to more than 200,000 inhabitants of the Nicosia area. Data were gathered on a daily basis for thirtysix consecutive months from January 2011 to December 2013 (for the scope of the analysis, data are aggregated per month). Total number of visits is 369,970. In addition to the total sample, we created nine age cohorts (0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69,70-79, and for persons over 80) as well as the two sexes making a total population of 12 estimations.
Statistical Analysis
We used an interrupted time-series (ITS) analysis to assess whether co-payment altered rates of ER utilization, and to assess the different impact among age cohorts. ITS analysis is among the most potent quasi-experimental research designs [37] and is used in cases where an intervention occurs at a specific point. ITS analysis can evaluate outcomes using population-level data and control for secular trends in the data, in contrast to other statistical tools [38, 39] , while it is a good alternative in cases where a randomized prospective trial is not feasible [40] . However, it requires a minimum number of observations, at least 15 time-points, divided prior to and after the intervention.
We specified 12 autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models for all age groups, the two sexes, and the total population. ARIMA model analyzes univariate time-series data. The model predicts a value in time series in the form of a linear combination of the past and current values and errors of the model [40] [41] [42] .
We assume that regression follows the pattern [40] :
V t is the number of visits to ER in month t. Time indicates the total number of months from the beginning of data processing. It is assigned ordinal (sequential) numbers, from 1 to 36, corresponding to the months of the study. Intervention is a binary dummy variable (0 value in the pre-intervention period and 1 in the post-intervention period). Postco-payment depicts the pre-intervention period. It is assigned a value of 0 prior to the co-payment, while after its introduction it gets the same values as the time variable. Blo 0 is an estimator of the base level effect at the beginning, Blo 1 estimates the base trend prior to co-payment, Blo 2 is an estimator of the slope change after the introduction of the co-payment and Blo 3 estimates the trend change after the introduction of the copayment. e t estimates the error of the model.
We followed the Box-Jenkins method to identify the model and estimated average rank regression with monthly data of ER visits for three consecutive years, for deciding between logarithmic and linear models [43] . We also used the standard integration tests for seasonality. We assessed partial autocorrelation factor (PACF) and autocorrelation factor (ACF). White noise condition for the residuals was assessed though the Ljung Box test. This will enable us to assess how data fit the model. This test is applied to the autocorrelations of the residuals to identify whether they are random [44] . Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), a general measure of the overall fit of a model, is used to define parameters of ARIMA model.
Moreover, based on dynamic forecast, we will calculate counterfactual number ER; that is visits to ER if co-payment was not introduced. We will assess the respective impact in intervals of one, two and three months following the introduction of co-payment.
Finally, model will be tested for under-fitting (dropping of questionable parameters) and over-fitting (including extra parameters) through the use of R 2 [40] .
Results
We assessed the results in three monthly intervals, after the introduction of the measure. Prior to co-payment, average monthly visits to ER were 10,090. After the introduction of the co-payment, monthly average visits fell to 8101. A marginal drop in ER visits was also observed prior to introduction of the measure, which was not significant in any of the age/sex cohorts. Overall, this approach achieved a statistically significant reduction in ER visits after the introduction of the copayment measure. Compared to the forecast visits, as defined by the ARIMA model (values which would have occurred if co-payment was not introduced), we estimated that co-payment led to a 15.6 % reduction of visits in the first month, which slightly increased at the end of the observational period to 16.01 % (Table 1; Fig. 1 ).
There is also a difference in responses between different age cohorts. No reduction was observed in the 0-9 and 10-19 age groups, nor in the age groups over 70. Age groups 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59 demonstrated a significant impact after the first month, which was also sustained in the third month (Figs. 1-4 in Electronic Supplementary Material). Only the age group 60-69 demonstrated a highly significant impact from the first month ( Fig. 3 in electronic supplementary material) . No differences were observed between men and women (Fig. 2) . Model of fit was assessed through Ljung Box, which carried non-significant p values. This suggests that the model fits well and residuals were random (white noise) ( Table 2) . No outliers were observed. This was also confirmed by ACF and PACF, indicating removal of non-random variation, along with visual inspection for residual spikes.
Goodness-of-Fit
We used R 2 to measure how fit of model can explain data variation. R 2 is the square of the correlation between the response values and the predicted response values. It is also called the square of the multiple correlation co-efficient and the co-efficient of multiple determination. Results indicated high R 2 values, suggesting that model fit explains, to a considerable level, data variance (Table 2) . These are further substantiated by absolute mean errors (MAPE) and maximum absolute percentage error (Max-APE). Absolute percentage error measures the variation of a dependent series from its model-predicted level, and indicates the uncertainty of the outcomes [45] . MaxAPE indicates the biggest possible forecasted error, which is expressed as a percentage. This measure is useful for imagining a worst-case scenario for the analysis forecasts, which in our case is the number of ER visits. In our models, the MAPE varies from 1.2 to 4.6 %. For the total population, mean value is 3.1 %.The MaxAPE ranges from 6.1 % to 9.2 %, while it is at 8.1 % for the total population. Both measures demonstrate high accuracy of the model [46] .
Discussion
This is the first study to evaluate the short-term effect of Cyprus' cost-sharing measures, in the form of fixed copayment on ER visits. Overall, we found a statistically significant reduction in visits to ER after the introduction of co-payment. These findings are in line with previous authors who stated that co-payment engages patients in a more rational self-triage process [2] , a process which ultimately curbed non-urgent visits and shifted patients to more suitable primary health-care centers. Based on our findings, it can be argued that savings can be achieved, since ER overuse constitutes a significant waste of health resources, which is magnified in recession-hit Cyprus. Introduction of user charges has been associated with a reduction of excessive or unnecessary demand of health services in other health-care settings [47] . In the USA, similar results were reported after the introduction of a copayment for ER visits, while authors who reported a significant reduction of ER visits, also concluded that this did not lead to negative effects on public health, indicating that patients resorted to other suitable sources of medical care [33, 48] . In Italy, a varying co-payment level, according to triage results, was implemented with satisfactory results. Similar findings were also observed in South Korea. Nevertheless, the differences between patients in different income tiers cancelled out savings [49] , since this measure disproportionately affected lower-income patients. Most worryingly, a Taiwan study concluded that the rate of decrease was irrelevant to the severity of disease, underlining that this measure depleted selectivity [50] . This has led to delays in seeking necessary medical services, which aggravated the health condition of severely ill patients. Therefore, co-payment may lead to unequal access to health care based on ability to pay. As a result, this would violate equity in health care, which would obliterate any efficiency gains borne out of this measure. Several EU countries addressed this issue by introducing reforms in their health services, rather than solely resorting to imposing user charges. In Finland, a bundle of policies addressed ER overuse, such as telephone center for minor cases, while in Denmark, Netherlands, and Sweden, several initiatives were implemented to encourage people to visit their GP, such as extension of operating hours [17] .
Further analysis for age cohorts demonstrated drastic reduction for the age cohorts 20-69. These findings are very significant, since these age cohorts account for more than 80 % of people visiting ERs. These findings further raise hopes for a significant impact of co-payment on efficiency enhancement and reduction of waste in the provision of health care.
What raised concerns and calls for careful assessment, are the two ends of our sample: persons aged over 70 and persons younger than 19 years of age (teenagers and children). It is apparent that, for these two categories, copayment has no impact and has failed to limit visits. More research is needed to define whether these patients resort to ER due to lack of alternative health services, greater health-care needs, higher costs or access issues elsewhere. Although we do not have a qualitative analysis of the reasons why elderly people visit ERs, other authors concluded that this is primarily attributed to manifestations of chronic conditions such as blood pressure, asthma, and musculoskeletal conditions [51] . This indicates, as a potential solution, the establishment of health centers targeted to the elderly with extended operating hours, such as patient-centered clinics, and interdisciplinary ER geriatric and palliative-care teams, as in the case of France [17] . 
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Visits to ER-Total PopulaƟon Fig. 1 Visits to ER-total population. Arrow indicates introduction of co-payment Moreover, use of the community nurse should be further expanded to cover chronic patients [52] . Finally, by appealing to solidarity and equity principles, the exception of some vulnerable groups from co-payment would be considered. Nevertheless, this should be designated as a last resort, purely on grounds of ER's impaired capacity to provide health care for chronic conditions, since ERs are better suited to providing care for acute cases [53] . It is imperative to interpret all aforementioned data in the interrelated context of aging, income, and utilization of health resources. Persons aged over 70 years face the highest risk of impoverishment, compared to all other age cohorts, since they comprise the lowest income group [54] . This is coupled with the highest utilization rate of health care in these age cohorts (persons aged over 70) [55] . Consequently, fixed co-payment acts as a regressive tax, further corroborating the notion that co-payment disproportionally burdens the lower income and frequent healthcare user cohorts [30, 56] . Since we analyzed only the short-term impact of co-payment, further research is required to assess whether this price insensitivity, intertwined with increased health-care needs and reduced resources, will eventually limit patient access to the necessary care, due to inability to pay in the long term [31, [56] [57] [58] . In this case, costs will be shifted and magnified at a later stage, as hospitalization offsets, and efficiency gains of the system will be counterbalanced by inequity in access. In this instance, co-payment leads to an unequivocal financial burden on these age groups, since these people are financially burdened due to their health condition, regardless of their ability to pay. There is a need for caution because the median age of people visiting ERs is rising, therefore it is anticipated that inelasticity of co-payment as a demandside measure, will be relevant for a larger population, and any potential impact on health equity will be magnified [59] .
Similar price insensitivity was observed in the infant children and teenager categories, which are in line with findings from the USA [32] .
Taking all the above into consideration, it is apparent that the product-mix composition of reduced visits merits additional research. In the context of efficiency improvement of an ER department, while sustaining health equity, it must be elucidated what type of ER visits were reduced.
Co-payment should not emerge as a barrier to emergency visits, but on the contrary, it should selectively constrain non-urgent/avoidable visits [59, 60] . A recently published patient cross-sectional study of 855 health-care users in Cyprus, reported that co-payment predominantly reduced non-urgent/avoidable visits, while 82 % of the sample assessed co-payment as a ''positive and much needed measure'' [61] . These findings were also in line with another report underlining primarily reduction of non-urgent visits, thus enhancing efficiency of the system [37] . All aforementioned data accentuate the beneficial contribution of co-payment in Cyprus.
The relative simplicity of a fixed, not capped, amount must not distort the need for further efficient and sustainable measures, which would be applicable in ER departments. Even though filtering and restraining access to ER is the primary goal, the ER operational framework must be optimized in order to increase efficiency. It was proven that certain functions in an ER department, such as laboratory and X-ray turnaround, chart flow and time to admission, account for more than its 50 % operational capacity [62] . Therefore, focusing and optimizing on nursing staff, laboratory, and X-ray turnaround, chart flow systems within the department, and time to admission, would probably improve the performance and operational capacity of an ER department [53] .
Data refer to a single hospital in Cyprus, which provides health care to more than half of Cyprus' population, while it is the center of reference for many specialties. In this sense, we believe that the findings illustrate the general situation in Cyprus.
Overall, co-payment was proven to be a potent measure in reducing overuse of ER departments. This issue should be closely monitored for its sustainability, since very few data exist regarding its long-term potency. It is also imperative to be vigilant for any potential public health adverse events.
Conclusion
It is often said that an ER department is a small-scale depiction of a country's health reality [63] . Our findings indicate that overuse of the ER occurred and introduction of co-payment has proven its efficacy in Cyprus' primary ER department. Some vulnerable patient age cohorts proved inelastic to this measure, indicating that this can be attributed to lack of alternative options, higher costs elsewhere, or access issues. Therefore, health services must scrutinize findings in order to verify that co-payment is not penalizing financially some patient groups, while concomitantly the long-term sustainability of this measure must be assessed, safeguarded, and upgraded. 
